AntiMalwareSeptember 8, 2026🇷🇺Translated from Russian

Researchers Create 0-Click WeChat Worm That Hijacks Accounts via Incoming Calls

Security researchers at Calif have developed a 0-click worm that can silently compromise WeChat accounts through incoming voice calls. The attack requires no user action whatsoever: the victim does not need to answer, tap any link, or even touch the device, provided the attacker is already present in the contact list.

In a live demonstration, an Android smartphone placed a call to an iPhone and successfully hijacked its WeChat account while the ringing continued. The newly compromised iPhone then automatically targeted a second Android device, turning each trusted contact into the next vector for propagation. This behavior closely resembles a traditional network worm, except that the infection chain consists of WeChat user profiles rather than computers.

Responding to the call does not stop the exploit; the user hears only silence while the payload continues executing in the background. Declining the call interrupts the current attempt, yet nothing prevents the attacker from retrying later, including during nighttime hours when the device is likely unattended.

Once the account is taken over, the researchers obtained complete control: they could read and send messages, initiate calls, and operate under the victim’s identity. The underlying smartphone itself is not compromised, but for a platform that integrates messaging, payments, mini-programs, and 1.4 billion active users, account-level access alone creates significant risk.

Calif reported the vulnerability to Tencent in July. The company subsequently released WeChat 8.0.77 for Android and WeChat 8.0.76 for iOS. On 28 August, the researchers confirmed that server-side mitigations now block the exploit for all users. While installing the application update remains advisable, no client-side patch is required for the server-side protection. No evidence of in-the-wild exploitation has been found, and neither a CVE identifier nor an official Tencent security bulletin has been published yet. Technical details are being withheld until an upcoming conference. The team noted that artificial intelligence assisted in discovering the vulnerability and building the initial exploit.

Related articles

BoletimSecMalware & Botnets

Cybercriminals Distribute NJRAT, DCRAT and Chaos via Fake GTA 6 Downloads

Threat actors are leveraging anticipation around GTA 6 to spread multiple malware families through fake game downloads. Security researchers at Huntress identified campaigns that combine search-engine poisoning, gaming forums, torrent sites and social-media posts to deliver oversized fake ISO files exceeding 100 GB. Victims who execute the installer see Russian-language messages claiming an invalid crack or missing license, while remote-access tools and data stealers run silently in the background. The delivered payloads include NJRAT and DCRAT for keystroke logging, screen capture and webcam access, Mercurial Grabber for harvesting browser credentials and Discord tokens, and the Chaos wiper that encrypts small files and overwrites larger ones. The operation primarily targets Russian-speaking gamers, as indicated by the ransom note and error messages. Analysts recommend avoiding unofficial downloads and isolating any compromised systems immediately.

HabrMalware & Botnets

Smartphone Spyware: How Devices Collect and Exfiltrate Data Even Without Internet Access

Modern smartphones continue gathering sensor data including microphone, camera, gyroscope, and satellite navigation even when Wi-Fi and mobile data are disabled. Information is stored locally and transmitted only when connectivity is restored. The Find My Device feature from Google and Find My from Apple allow location reporting for hours after the device is powered off via a separate Bluetooth chip. In August 2026, ThreatFabric disclosed the Manic trojan that uses Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth RFCOMM, and BLE GATT to relay encrypted data through nearby infected devices when direct internet access is unavailable. The malware supports multi-hop routing of up to four intermediate devices. Everyday users face greater risk from over-privileged applications and pre-installed malware on gray-market devices than from sophisticated offline exfiltration techniques. A detailed checklist covers purchase hygiene, permission audits, and recovery steps after suspected compromise.

AntiMalwareMalware & Botnets

Reconstructed Stuxnet Source Code Published on GitHub with Build Instructions

An unknown researcher has released a reconstructed version of the Stuxnet worm source code on GitHub, including reverse-engineering results and assembly instructions. Stuxnet was discovered in 2010 and is widely attributed to the joint US-Israeli Olympic Games operation targeting Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The malware specifically attacked Siemens industrial controllers by altering frequency converter operations to physically damage centrifuge rotors while falsifying operator displays. Propagation relied on USB drives, network shares, and a Windows Print Spooler vulnerability, combined with stolen Realtek and JMicron driver-signing certificates. The worm also injected itself into Siemens WinCC and Step 7 software to intercept communications with programmable logic controllers. Due to a flaw in its environment checks, Stuxnet escaped the target network and spread publicly before its built-in June 2012 self-destruct date. Researchers are advised to analyze the code only inside fully isolated virtual machines without network access.

HabrMalware & Botnets

Website Protection Against Bots: Six Years of Traffic Filtering Evolution from Behavioral Bots to Multi-Layer Analytics

The article traces the author's journey starting in 2020 when anomalous traffic from social networks began flooding websites, initially appearing as visits from Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and VKontakte. Early attempts using .htaccess rules to block referrers failed as bots dynamically switched to direct or external domain transitions. Server-side JavaScript and cookie checks altered bot behavior but did not stop the flow, revealing that successful browser checks only confirm technical capability rather than human presence. IP blocking of ranges like 31.173.80.0/21 and 178.176.64.0/19 provided temporary relief until mobile proxies rotated addresses, exposing the limits of static blacklists. IPv6 adoption further demonstrated how address-family-specific rules quickly become obsolete. Fingerprint spoofing and constant rotation of digital prints made single-signal identification unreliable. The core lesson emphasizes real-time filtering at the edge over post-hoc analytics exclusion to prevent bots from reaching the web server at all.