Habr•September 1, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

From MTTD and MTTR to Real Value: How to Organize SOC Metrics Effectively

Anatoly Antipov, who leads the L1 analyst group in a small in-house SOC of up to eight people, describes how classic time-based metrics often produce the opposite of their intended effect. Many leaders start the day reviewing dashboards built around MTTD, MTTR, and similar indicators recommended by NIST SP 800-61. These numbers look clean in quarterly reports, yet they frequently hide shallow investigations and growing technical debt.

The SANS SOC Survey highlights the same pattern: when speed and volume become the only targets, analysts begin optimizing for the metric instead of security outcomes. One documented case showed a simple script automatically moving new alerts into the “in progress” state to keep MTTA numbers green while real cases sat untouched for hours.

To address this, the team introduced a strict five-level verdict matrix. The categories are TP.Ext for confirmed external attacks, TP.Int for internal policy violations, BP for authorized testing activity, FP for legitimate business or IT actions, and FP.SOC for problems inside detection content, parsing, or filtering logic. This classification makes it immediately visible where the SOC is generating value and where it is accumulating its own technical debt.

The weekly report was rebuilt around three focused blocks. The first shows overall alert volume, closure rates, backlog, and shift workload distribution. The second breaks alerts down by the new verdict matrix so managers can see whether rising false positives stem from business changes or from SIEM and SOAR content issues. The third block lists real confirmed incidents together with concrete effort indicators such as emails sent, EDR scans launched, and indicators blocked.

Every week a sample of closed alerts from each analyst undergoes quality review. Reviewers check whether the verdict is correct, whether actions are fully documented, whether sufficient artifacts are attached, and whether FP.SOC items include clear recommendations for rule improvement. The process prevents analysts from being rated solely on speed.

The changes demonstrate that Mean Time metrics remain useful when paired with quality controls, transparent verdicts, and regular audits. Without these additions, small SOC teams risk turning into expensive click farms that look efficient on dashboards while actual risk reduction quietly declines.

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