AI Agent Uncovers Unauthenticated Router Config Dump Leading to CVE Filing
An experienced security engineer running a home lab with Proxmox VE asked an LLM agent to document router administration methods. The agent was given only basic port information and instructed to verify available functionality. Overnight the agent located an unauthenticated configuration read endpoint on the router’s web interface.
The endpoint returned approximately 37 KB of configuration data containing the administrative password in base64, all WPA2 pre-shared keys, service credentials, and full network settings. The agent confirmed that the corresponding write endpoint correctly required authentication, indicating a design flaw rather than an intentional backdoor. It then used the extracted credentials to obtain a valid session cookie, proving full administrative access was possible from any device on the LAN.
Technical details and classification
The router runs an ancient Boa web server exposing a single-page application built with jQuery. JavaScript bundles revealed the real API endpoints. The flaw was classified as CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function, with secondary weaknesses CWE-522 and CWE-359. The agent calculated a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
External scans confirmed the issue is strictly LAN-facing because WAN management remains disabled. The researcher could not locate current firmware updates due to unresponsive vendor infrastructure, a fact also included in the disclosure.
Path to CVE registration
The agent prepared a bilingual coordinated disclosure report for the vendor and assembled the required fields for the MITRE CNA-LR submission using knowledge of the Vulnogram form. The researcher personally sent the email and submitted the CVE request. A parallel entry was created in VulDB. The 90-day disclosure window is now open.
Key takeaways for agent use in security research
- Read-only permission boundaries successfully limited the agent to reconnaissance and verification steps.
- The agent performed exhaustive enumeration of JavaScript files, endpoints, and public vulnerability databases far faster than a human researcher.
- Final actions requiring accounts or submissions remained under human control.
- Home labs provide a safe, legal environment for testing autonomous security agents.
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