HackerSec's Yaga Pentest Agent Reaches 98.8% Effectiveness in White Box Testing
The offensive cybersecurity company HackerSec has reported that its Yaga pentest agent attained 98.8% effectiveness in white box scenarios during the most recent version of YagaBench. The agent also achieved 96.2% effectiveness in black box testing and 97% in gray box testing, representing the strongest performance recorded since the benchmark began.
These results demonstrate that Yaga successfully identified more than 98% of existing vulnerabilities in the evaluated environments. The central purpose of the benchmark is to measure the difference between using an isolated AI model and deploying the same models inside the specialized harness developed by HackerSec for penetration testing.
For example, the model Opus 5 without the Yaga harness achieved only 61% effectiveness in white box, 48.9% in gray box, and 40% in black box scenarios. Similarly, GPT 5.6 SOL reached 60.9% in white box and 39.5% in black box testing when used independently.
With Yaga, four models operate in an orchestrated manner during a single execution, each contributing at the stage where it performs best. The orchestration layer preserves context between testing phases, chains individual findings that would otherwise lack impact, and continues active exploitation until it confirms whether a vulnerability is truly exploitable.
The company also disclosed that false positives have been reduced to less than 1%. Remaining cases are identified and discarded by human pentesters during the validation stage before reaching the client dashboard.
According to Andrew Martinez, CEO of HackerSec, the current results represent only the beginning. The company’s goal is to achieve 99% effectiveness across all pentest modalities by the end of the year. Full methodology, evaluated scenarios, and model performance comparisons are available at the company’s evaluation portal.
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