Trusting Russian Root Certificates and Monitoring Domestic CT Logs
The discussion around trust in Russian root certificates issued by the Ministry of Digital Development and Communications has intensified following recent issues with GOST certificates on Gosuslugi. Users are weighing the security implications of adding these roots to system stores, browser profiles, or relying on Yandex Browser where they are pre-installed.
Root certificates themselves do not compromise systems, yet placing them in trusted stores creates a pathway for traffic interception. Entities with access to network flows via the TSPU system can issue intermediate certificates signed by the Russian root and perform real-time MitM attacks against sites such as gmail.com or telegram.org.
Defensive measures remain limited. One approach involves isolating the Russian roots to a dedicated browser profile used only for domestic sites that require them. Advanced configurations can further restrict the roots to specific domains such as *.ru.
Certificate Transparency as a Mitigation
Certificate Transparency logs record every issued certificate in an append-only structure, embedding proof of inclusion inside the certificate. Yandex Browser refuses certificates lacking a valid SCT from approved logs, significantly raising the bar for undetected MitM operations and leaving forensic traces.
Other browsers automatically disable CT verification for chains anchored to manually added roots, treating them as corporate environments. This behavior reduces visibility into potential abuse of Russian intermediates.
Domestic CT Logs
Three primary logs are recognized by Yandex:
- Yandex Agate Log (2026 and 2027 instances)
- VK NCA Log (2026 and 2027 instances)
- Ministry of Digital Development and Communications Log (2026 and 2027 instances)
Log endpoints rotate yearly, and the authoritative list is published at browser-resources.s3.yandex.net/ctlog/ctlog.json.
Verification Tools
Public monitors such as ct.tlscc.ru have shown gaps in coverage for newer log addresses and certain active certificates. A Python utility was developed to fetch the current log list, parse embedded SCTs, reconstruct precertificates, and query each domestic log via the standard CT HTTP API for inclusion proofs.
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