Sorry Ransomware Exploits cPanel Vulnerability to Directly Lock Linux Servers in Multiple Chinese Incidents
China's National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center has issued an alert after multiple real-world incidents involving the Sorry ransomware. The malware reaches internet-facing Linux web servers through a cPanel authorization vulnerability (CNNVD-202604-5641, CVE-2026-41940) and operates without any phishing emails or user mistakes.
Last Friday at 10:30 p.m., an ERP implementation specialist received an urgent call from a manufacturing client whose entire business system had become inaccessible. Every file now carried the .sorry extension, and a ransom note instructed victims to download an encrypted messaging tool to negotiate payment. On-site inspection revealed stopped databases, killed backup services, and fully encrypted website files, all achieved without any visible signs of compromise.
Attack vector and stealth techniques
Unlike typical ransomware that relies on email attachments, Sorry is written in Go and directly exploits a cPanel flaw to obtain server management rights. Once inside, the malware masquerades as the standard sshd process, making detection difficult for system administrators. The same binary runs on most mainstream Linux distributions, including domestic Xinchuang operating systems now being deployed in government, finance, energy, and healthcare sectors.
Six-stage attack chain
- Network intrusion: Silent deployment via the cPanel vulnerability and process masquerading.
- Environment reconnaissance: Collection of username, hostname, CPU count, OS version, and network interfaces sent back to the attackers.
- Obstacle removal: Termination of database, security, and backup services.
- Data theft: Exfiltration of business data and documents for potential double extortion.
- Encryption: AES encryption of files followed by RSA protection of the AES key; all files receive the .sorry suffix.
- Lateral movement: Scanning of ports 22, 2222, and 22222 for weak SSH passwords to spread across the internal network.
Small and medium-sized enterprises remain the primary targets because they often expose cPanel panels directly to the internet, reuse weak passwords, and lack offline backups. The center recommends immediate version checks and updates for cPanel, WHM, and WP Squared, strict network exposure reduction through VPNs or bastion hosts, strong unique credentials, up-to-date Linux antivirus with real-time monitoring, truly offline backups, and verification of suspicious files via the national analysis platform before execution.
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