AntiMalware•August 14, 2026•🇷🇺Translated from Russian

US Federal Judge Orders Google to Simplify Installation of Third-Party App Stores on Android

A federal judge in the United States has ordered Google to eliminate unnecessary warnings and intermediate steps when users install competing app stores on Android devices through Google Play.

Federal Judge James Donato issued the directive during a hearing on the enforcement of remedies in the antitrust case brought by Epic Games against Google. Lawyers for Epic demonstrated that the current process prevents immediate installation of a third-party store: users first encounter additional screens and must click a “See more” button before the “Install” option appears.

The court described this design as a deliberate obstacle intended to deter average users. Judge Donato required Google to make the installation of an alternative app store as simple as downloading any ordinary Android application.

Although Android has technically allowed sideloading of applications and stores from outside sources for many years, the process has involved repeated security warnings, concealed permission toggles, and multiple confirmation dialogs. For technically skilled users these steps represent minor inconvenience, yet for the majority they function as a strong deterrent that encourages immediate return to Google Play.

The order follows the jury’s earlier finding that Google unlawfully monopolized the distribution of Android applications and the handling of in-app payments. Google maintains that the additional checks are necessary to protect users and devices from harm, but the court rejected the argument that security measures should serve as a convenient pretext for preserving market position.

This week the US version of Google Play featured its first third-party app store, Aptoide, which previously required manual installation via an APK file. The new arrangement allows users to obtain the store without navigating security settings or confronting alarming warnings.

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