Russia's Ministry of Digital Development to Bind M2M SIM Cards to Devices and Restrict Unauthorized Calls Starting 2027
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development has put forward a draft regulation that will require all Russian companies and individual entrepreneurs to register their M2M SIM cards and the connected equipment in the ESIA system.
The new rules are planned to take effect on 1 September 2027. Under the proposal, devices such as ATMs, payment terminals, sensors, and smart meters will receive digital passports, and their SIM cards will be permanently linked to specific hardware.
Operators will be allowed to offer businesses a single management platform for M2M numbers. Through this platform companies will be able to activate or deactivate SIM cards, verify equipment status, determine device location via base stations, and block service in case of loss or malfunction.
Registration in ESIA will require the following data: SIM number, owner’s INN, operator information, equipment type and name, device identifier, and installation address. Data can be submitted either via the Gosuslugi portal or through the operator’s own platform.
Each M2M SIM card must be rigidly bound to one device. Changing the device identifier will be permitted no more than once per month, except in cases of breakdown or loss. If the information in ESIA does not match the actual equipment, the operator must suspend service until the records are corrected.
Communication controls will also be tightened. Companies will be able to create white lists of allowed numbers for calls and SMS. Voice calls will be limited to one minute, while mass messaging and auto-dialing will be prohibited except for pre-approved senders. Updates to white-list contacts will likewise be restricted to once per month.
The Ministry explains the initiative as a measure against fraudsters who currently exploit M2M SIM cards for anonymous mass calling and messaging because these cards can be used for ordinary mobile voice services. The new framework is intended to confine M2M cards to their original purpose of transmitting telemetry data from ATMs, meters, and similar equipment.
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