Aladdin Obtains New FSB Certificate for CryptoFlash Encrypted USB Drive Valid Until 2029
Aladdin has obtained a new certificate from FSB Russia for its Aladdin CryptoFlash protected flash drive. The document, numbered СФ/124-5574, is valid until 16 July 2029 and confirms that the device meets the requirements for cryptographic protection tools of classes KS1 and KS2.
Alongside the new certificate, the drive received several technical updates. Supported Linux distributions now include RED OS 7.3 and 8, Alt 8 SP Workstation, Alt Workstation 10, and the operating system of the Moscow Electronic School. The graphical interface has been refined and read/write speeds increased to 11 MB/s.
Aladdin CryptoFlash is a USB drive with built-in hardware encryption based on the Russian Magma algorithm. It is intended for storage and transfer of information that does not contain state secrets, including official and confidential data marked DSP. The device belongs to the clientless class, meaning no additional software, drivers, or cryptographic applications need to be installed on the host computer.
The previous certificate, number СФ/124-5342 issued on 15 December 2025, remains valid until 15 December 2028. Consequently, two active FSB certificates now cover the product line, with the new document applying specifically to the updated version of the device.
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