Executive Loses $5 Million Golden Parachute After Uploading Documents to DeepSeek
A top manager at a Moscow engineering company attempted to secure five million rubles after her dismissal for disclosing commercial secrets but ultimately lost the case. The court determined that uploading internal documents to DeepSeek was not an acceptable method for obtaining a golden parachute.
The woman had served as sales director for less than six months and received more than 800,000 rubles per month. Following her termination initiated by the employer, she filed a lawsuit to amend the dismissal grounds to mutual agreement and to receive the corresponding five-million-ruble compensation.
The company countered that the employee had repeatedly mishandled confidential data. She forwarded official documents via corporate email while adding her personal address in blind copy. In addition, several files from the company’s internal protected repository were uploaded to the Chinese neural network DeepSeek, which the employer argued created a risk of information interception.
The court found no operational necessity for either sending documents to an email address outside company control or placing them in a third-party AI service. These actions were classified as a gross violation of labor duties and disclosure of commercial and official secrets.
The employer further stated that after confidential information was disclosed during negotiations, one supplier ceased all communication. The company also cited the employee’s systematic failure to meet sales targets.
During proceedings the company proposed a settlement that would change the dismissal wording and pay more than 400,000 rubles, but the former employee rejected the offer in hopes of receiving the full five million. The court dismissed her claims.
The case gained attention following reports that user conversations with DeepSeek had appeared in Google search results, although the ruling did not require proof of an actual leak—only the fact that protected documents had been transferred to an external service.
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