How CISOs Can Speak to CEOs: Translating Cyber Risks into Business Impact and Financial Consequences
The morning of July 28, 2025, brought a major cyber incident to Aeroflot, resulting in widespread flight cancellations. Groups Silent Crow and Belarusian Cyber-Partisans claimed they had maintained access to the airline’s internal network for over a year, exfiltrated data, and disabled thousands of servers. Although the company did not publicly confirm the full scope, the operational fallout—canceled flights, a criminal case opened by prosecutors, market scrutiny of shares, and stranded passengers—moved the event beyond purely technical territory.
In almost every large organization, security teams have previously documented weak points such as legacy systems, third-party contractors, privileged accounts, and poorly segmented networks. Yet these warnings are frequently viewed by executives as routine budget requests rather than credible scenarios for business disruption. The core issue often lies not in firewalls or detection tools but in the language used to convey risk to the CEO.
Two Languages in One Office
CISOs typically present data on EDR coverage, mean time to detect, vulnerability remediation rates, and multi-factor authentication adoption. CEOs mentally convert these figures into questions about potential financial loss, halted processes, accountability to customers and regulators, and effects on revenue if action is postponed. Surveys by EY reveal a perception gap: 68% of CISOs believe senior leadership underestimates cyber threats, while 57% of other C-level executives agree. Splunk’s CISO Report 2025 shows that 46% of CISOs measure success by security milestones, compared with only 19% of board members who expect return-on-investment language and concrete damage reduction.
Real-World Consequences of Miscommunication
Several 2024–2025 incidents illustrated the cost of failing to translate technical risks:
- Marks & Spencer lost contactless payments and online order fulfillment for weeks after an attack attributed to a third-party contractor, with profit impact estimated at £300 million.
- Jaguar Land Rover halted global production for nearly six weeks following detected unauthorized activity, causing an estimated £1.9 billion loss to the UK economy.
- Clorox filed a $380 million lawsuit against Cognizant over a 2023 incident allegedly enabled by inadequate identity verification at the service desk.
- Change Healthcare suffered a breach through a Citrix portal lacking multi-factor authentication; UnitedHealth later confirmed a $22 million ransom payment and exposure affecting approximately 190 million individuals.
Regulatory Pressure and Personal Liability
Actions by the SEC against SolarWinds CISO Timothy Brown and the criminal conviction of Uber’s former security chief Joe Sullivan established that statements to regulators and disclosure timing can result in personal legal consequences. In Russia, Federal Law No. 420-FZ introduced turnover-based fines for personal data breaches, reaching 1–3% of annual revenue. These developments make cybersecurity a direct concern for boards and top executives.
Recommended Translation Approach
The article supplies a practical mapping of common CISO statements into language CEOs understand, emphasizing specific business processes that could stop, daily downtime costs, and comparisons between proactive investment and post-incident remediation expenses. Effective dialogue begins with three questions: which business process may halt, what a day of downtime costs, and whether reducing risk now is cheaper than explaining consequences later.
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