ClickLock Stealer Locks macOS Until Victims Enter Real Passwords and Exfiltrates Browser, Crypto and Keychain Data
Researchers at Group-IB have uncovered a previously unknown macOS infostealer that literally locks victims out of their computers until they supply valid login credentials. The newly identified threat, dubbed ClickLock Stealer, has been active since May 2026 and has already impacted at least 100 users in 33 countries.
The attack chain starts with a fake Cloudflare verification page. Unsuspecting users are instructed to copy and paste a command into the Terminal. While the victim watches a convincing browser-check animation with a progress bar, the script silently downloads four malicious modules hosted on compromised WordPress sites.
Once the modules are in place, a realistic macOS authentication dialog appears displaying the user’s real account name and requesting the password. ClickLock validates the entered password against the local directory service and transmits only working credentials to the operators. Pressing “Cancel” is ineffective: two LaunchAgent modules are installed that reactivate on every login.
One agent repeatedly closes every visible application every 210 milliseconds, leaving only the password-entry window on screen. The second agent forces the user to approve a genuine Keychain authorization prompt, allowing the malware to steal the encryption key for Chrome Safe Storage. A separate background process disables the Notification Center for several hours to prevent users from spotting suspicious activity.
The harvested data is extensive. ClickLock extracts credentials and cookies from eight browsers, 31 cryptocurrency-wallet browser extensions, seven password managers, eight desktop cryptocurrency wallets, the full Keychain database, Terminal command history, FTP account details and wallet addresses on six different blockchains. Stolen information is sent to the attackers through Telegram bots and compromised domains.
After completing its tasks, most modules delete themselves and tamper with file timestamps to hinder forensic analysis. A persistent, disguised GSocket backdoor remains on the system for potential future access. Investigators consider a connection to the ClickFix social-engineering technique highly likely, although the actual phishing pages used in this campaign have not yet been observed.
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