RZD Trunk Quantum Network Obtains FSTEC Attestation and Enters External Commercial Market
RZD’s trunk quantum network has successfully completed attestation by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC). The official document confirms that the infrastructure fully complies with the regulatory requirements applicable to information systems of the second class of protection under Russian legislation.
This certification is far more than a formal document for RZD. It grants the company the legal right to provide commercial services based on its quantum network to third-party organizations, ranging from banks and industrial enterprises to medical institutions and transport companies. The primary focus of these services is the protection of critically important data.
Quantum communications offer a fundamentally higher level of security compared with traditional encryption. Any attempt to intercept the encryption keys is immediately detected because interference with the quantum channel changes the state of the transmitted particles, making the intrusion impossible to conceal. This capability is especially valuable for owners of critical information infrastructure objects, for whom conventional “complex passwords” are no longer considered sufficient protection.
The technology is already being actively tested in the financial sector. Among the organizations currently piloting quantum channels are the Bank of Russia, the Federal Treasury, the Financial University, and several of Russia’s largest banks. Potential future clients also include companies from the oil-and-gas industry, manufacturing, healthcare, and transportation sectors.
According to the Ministry of Digital Development, quantum communication technology has now reached a sufficiently high level of maturity. Further expansion of the quantum network until 2030 has been incorporated into the relevant departmental roadmap and the national project “Data Economy”.
Consequently, RZD is gradually evolving beyond its traditional role as a carrier of passengers and freight. The company is positioning itself as an operator of secure digital highways, where, in addition to conventional rail traffic, quantum keys will also travel along its infrastructure.
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