Russia to Mandate Gosuslugi Authentication for Hosting Providers, Further Reducing Anonymity in Runet
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development (MinTsifry) has resumed efforts to tighten control over hosting providers by proposing mandatory client identification through the Gosuslugi portal. The initiative would apply not to selected services but to virtually all hosting offerings, requiring every customer to authenticate via a confirmed ESIA account.
Under the proposed rules, each allocated IP address must be tied to a specific individual with a verified government-linked profile. Current identification methods—such as email addresses, bank cards, or other indirect verifications—are considered insufficient by regulators seeking greater transparency across the Russian internet segment known as Runet.
This policy builds directly on measures introduced in September for domain registrations. Owners of domains in the .ru, .рф, and .su zones must now confirm their identity through ESIA both when registering new domains and when renewing existing ones. Regulators intend to extend the same verification standard to hosting services.
Reactions within the hosting industry remain sharply divided. Turbo Cloud supports the change, arguing that mandatory identification will help combat phishing attacks and fraudulent schemes. The company has already integrated ESIA authentication and states that the associated expenses remain manageable for providers.
Other companies express more cautious or negative views. Runity estimates that preliminary implementation costs will reach at least 5 million rubles. RUVDS warns that the new requirements could severely damage the retail segment of the market, particularly affecting students, independent developers, and private individuals who may find the additional Gosuslugi verification step overly burdensome.
According to RUVDS assessments, providers could lose between 20% and 35% of such retail customers. These users are expected to migrate not to offline alternatives but to foreign hosting providers operating outside Russian jurisdiction.
A separate concern involves foreign clients. Without an alternative identification mechanism, non-Russian users may lose access to hosting services, servers, and domains. Overall, the push for greater transparency risks accelerating both the decline of online anonymity and the outflow of clients beyond Russia’s borders.
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