Russia's MinTsifry to Begin Issuing Official Code Signing Certificates in 2027
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development (MinTsifry) is preparing to issue official state certificates for signing software code. According to plans reported to Vedomosti, issuance of these certificates is scheduled to begin in 2027, while corporate security certificates are expected to follow in 2028.
The new digital signatures will allow operating systems to identify the publisher of an executable file and verify whether the code has been modified after its original release. This measure is intended to increase transparency for users when installing software from Russian developers.
A draft government resolution proposes granting MinTsifry the authority of the National Certification Authority. The ministry would define technical requirements for the certificates, issue and revoke them, establish validity periods, and maintain an official registry of issued certificates.
For end users, the practical benefit lies in the ability of the operating system to recognize the software publisher and display warnings about unknown developers. However, the presence of a valid signature does not mean the program is free of vulnerabilities; it only confirms the origin and integrity of the code.
The legislation allows the introduction of fees for obtaining certificates, but does not mandate them. Decisions regarding pricing and tariffs have not yet been finalized.
Technical acceptance of the new certificates by operating systems, browsers, and application stores will also be necessary. Outside Russia, automatic trust is not guaranteed, as foreign platform owners will make their own decisions. Developers targeting multiple markets may therefore need to obtain several different code signatures.
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