安全客•October 28, 2026•🇨🇳Translated from Chinese

From Accessible to Controllable: Ruishu Information Launches AITM for AI Agent Lifecycle Security

As AI Agent technology becomes embedded in enterprise research, office, and business processes, organizations face a fundamental shift: the question is no longer whether AI can improve efficiency, but whether it can be managed, controlled, and audited.

A reported incident at a multinational consulting firm illustrated the new risks. An autonomous intelligent agent attack allowed an attacker to move from interface reconnaissance through vulnerability discovery to full database read-write privileges. Standard vulnerability scanners failed to detect the specialized injection points, while the agent progressively inferred query structures by analyzing database error messages.

These risks extend beyond model-generated content and arise during autonomous task execution, tool invocation, and data access. Consequently, security controls must span admission, runtime, permission management, and data circulation rather than stopping at pre-deployment testing.

Why Agent Security Cannot End at Pre-Deployment Checks

Ruishu Information notes that third-party Skill and Prompt components introduce supply-chain risks. Without rigorous source management and security inspection, components may contain backdoor instructions or prompt-injection payloads that steer agents toward unauthorized actions.

Runtime threats include malicious code execution and privilege abuse. Agents or Skills capable of running commands or reading files can expose sensitive files, environment variables, and credentials if their tool access exceeds business requirements. Unregistered internal agents further complicate governance, as enterprises lack visibility into creation, resource connections, and permissions.

Real-world examples, such as an office AI assistant that extracted sensitive data after receiving hidden email instructions without user clicks, demonstrate that autonomous tool calls can occur without explicit user action.

Ruishu AITM: Building Lifecycle Controls from Admission to Runtime

AITM delivers three core capabilities: trusted admission, runtime guardianship, and data security. At admission, four analyzers—static rule scanning, behavioral rule analysis, large-model semantic judgment, and sandbox dynamic execution—evaluate Agents and Skills. Low-risk components receive automatic approval; high-risk items enter manual review. Submission is supported via CLI, Web, Go Scanner, and CI/CD pipelines.

During runtime, AITM performs loading verification, HMAC-SHA256 directory signing to detect tampering, and tool-permission whitelisting. Revoked components are blocked on subsequent loads. Integration options include lightweight Skill Verifier, Hook-based real-time interception, and client management for large-scale endpoints.

For large-model interactions, AITM acts as a unified security proxy that validates LLM API Key status, expiration, model scope, and concurrency limits. It detects PII entities according to privacy policies, replaces them with pseudonymous tokens before model requests, and restores original values in responses. Four-stage Trace auditing records the original request, tokenized request, model response, and final restored output while restricting raw prompt and response logging to authorized roles.

Establishing Clear, Traceable Boundaries for Agent Operations

Ruishu Information positions AITM for development scanning, production runtime control, security auditing, and CI/CD integration. The central challenge is no longer whether an Agent can be used, but what it calls, which data it accesses, whether its behavior is trustworthy, and how quickly risks can be contained. By embedding detection, verification, permission constraints, and auditing into daily operations, enterprises can maintain clearer security boundaries around autonomous AI systems.

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