Why Technically Strong CISOs Lose to Weaker Peers: The Hidden Role of Internal Politics
Andrey Biryukov, an independent IT and information security expert who teaches at training centers and authors books, examines why technically strong CISOs often lose internal battles despite superior expertise.
The typical scenario involves a capable CISO who has built a solid team and stays current on threats yet sees a predicted incident occur after budget requests were denied. In contrast, a less technical peer secures growing budgets, board attention, and cross-functional cooperation even after incidents. The difference, Biryukov argues, is the ability to sell the security program inside the organization—an undervalued soft skill rarely covered in certifications or interviews.
Why CISO Influence Matters More Than Formal Power
CISOs rarely possess direct authority over other departments. They cannot order the CFO to release funds, force business units to alter processes, or discipline developers who ignore security requirements. Their only tool is influence, which must be earned through trust, arguments, relationships, and political capital rather than granted by title.
Every security initiative requires decisions from others: funding, prioritization, acceptance of inconvenience, or process changes. When the CISO cannot sell these ideas effectively, initiatives stall, business units bypass security, budgets stagnate, and the CISO becomes the scapegoat after the first major incident.
Translating Security into Business Language
Business leaders operate under competing priorities. The CFO manages limited budgets across ten initiatives, the CTO faces release deadlines, and the CEO answers to investors. Abstract warnings such as “we could be breached” or “risk is critical” quickly lose impact. Effective communication instead uses concrete scenarios: lost clients, revenue impact in millions, weeks of payment-system downtime, and regulatory investigations lasting quarters.
Biryukov contrasts two requests for a new SIEM. The weak version states that the current tool covers only 70 percent of logs. The strong version explains that the blind spot affects systems handling 40 percent of payments, detection time would rise from hours to days, and one day of downtime would cost a specific amount while regulatory fines would reach another figure.
Building Coalitions and Narratives
Successful CISOs build relationships long before budget cycles through joint projects, informal conversations, and participation in other leaders’ initiatives. Political capital accumulated in calm periods is spent during crises. A clear narrative also helps: stating that in 18 months the organization will pass major client audits without exceptions and reduce cyber-insurance costs by a defined percentage, supported by specific initiatives such as identity management and segmentation, makes the program memorable and discussable even when the CISO is absent.
Objections are treated as invitations to further dialogue rather than walls. Asking “What would need to change for this to become a priority?” reveals the additional selling required. After incidents, a short window of attention opens; only CISOs who arrive with pre-calculated business cases capture new resources.
The article concludes that security programs without internal buy-in exist only on paper. Technical knowledge alone does not protect the organization; the ability to translate that knowledge into decisions by budget holders determines whether the program succeeds or the CISO becomes expendable.
Related articles
Protecting Data Centers from Kinetic and Cyber Attacks: What Regulators Worldwide Are Proposing
InfoWatch experts have updated their April report on data center resilience, highlighting how physical and cyber threats now directly threaten business continuity and national security. Regulators in the United States, European Union, and Russia are treating data centers as strategic infrastructure requiring layered defenses that combine physical hardening, geographic distribution, and strict cybersecurity controls. The United States has launched the Cyberstrategy for America 2026 emphasizing offensive operations, Zero Trust modernization, and supply-chain restrictions. The European Union is implementing ProtectEU and the Cyber Solidarity Act with real-time threat sharing and mandatory resilience standards under DORA. Russia is advancing technological sovereignty targets, new siting rules for data centers, and Presidential Decree No. 604 that enables temporary state management of inadequately protected critical facilities. The report also notes growing recognition that attacks on data centers can constitute acts of aggression under the Tallinn Manual.
US Department of Homeland Security Orders Federal Agencies to Remove DeepSeek Products
The US Department of Homeland Security issued an order on October 19 requiring federal civilian agencies to cease purchasing products from DeepSeek and to remove related technology from government systems. The directive, published the following day, targets Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence, its affiliates, and any third-party products or services built on DeepSeek implementations. The measure stems from the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 and follows a recommendation by the Federal Acquisition Security Council, though no specific incidents or evidence were detailed in the notice. The restriction applies only to federal environments and does not prohibit private sector or individual use outside government systems. No removal deadline was set, and the document does not name the signing authority. The order is filed under docket DHS-2026-0628 with the CISA implementation team listed as the contact point.
AKIT Requests Temporary Permission for Russian Companies to Transfer Personal Data Abroad After Data Center Incidents
The Association of Internet Trade Companies (AKIT) has sent a formal letter to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin proposing a temporary exemption from strict data localization rules. The measure would allow affected companies to move critical systems and Russian citizens' personal data to data centers in friendly countries when domestic infrastructure is unavailable due to accidents or damage. Members including Ozon, Wildberries, Cooper, and Yandex Market argue that services must continue operating even if Russian facilities are compromised. The proposed special regime would apply only after an officially confirmed incident, require compliance with information security standards, and end no later than March 1, 2028. After recovery, companies would be required to return to normal data processing within Russia. Expert Alexey Muntyan noted that the mechanism activates only after incidents occur and questioned whether countries should be selected based on data protection levels rather than political alignment.
Anthropic Model Reconstructs NSA Seeds for NIST Elliptic Curves in Under 30 Minutes
An internal Anthropic research model traced the origins of the five seeds used by the NSA to generate the NIST elliptic curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521. The discovery resolves a 25-year-old question that arose when the curves were standardized in FIPS 186-2 for ECDSA in 2000. Researchers combined analysis of 1990s random number generators, 34 generator-output combinations, and lattice reduction techniques to identify lrand48 initialized with Unix timestamps from May 1997 to April 1998. The P-256 seed corresponds to the 1842nd candidate from a run started on 16 August 1997, and example seeds from ANSI X9.62 follow the same pattern. The work does not demonstrate any cryptographic break or backdoor in the curves and does not recommend changes to production systems. Several questions remain open, including the seed for curve B-163 and the reason certain candidate values were discarded.